04/20/2006
print
send
printsend
An interview with Farian Sabahi
“There was no general popular consensus about Ahmadinejad. International pressure
is responsible for having created one.” This is Farian Sabahi’s reaction to recent
developments in the standoff between Iran and the international community. Sabahi
is professor of contemporary Iranian history at the University of Geneva and author
of a well-regarded History of Iran, which will come out in a new edition at the
beginning of June.
Counter-productive policy. The Iranian government held rallies in the streets of major cities to celebrate
enrichment of the first, small amounts of uranium—the first step in a process
that will make Iran a nuclear power. The Iranian government claims that uranium
enrichment is necessary for civil use and to satisfy energy demands; the US feels
Iran’s intentions are less noble. But to what extent do Ahmadinejad and his aggressive
rhetoric represent Iran?
Dark future. “The international embargo on Iran, for instance, effects civil aviation,” the
professor explains, “because the country’s aircraft are mostly Boeings acquired
back when the Shah was in power and now they can’t get replacement parts. Purchase
of aircraft from the European Airbus consortium has also been blocked. This is
just one way the embargo effects the lives of Iranians, but it’s certainly not
the ruling class. The embargo basically has the effect—as Rafsanjani himself admitted—of
consolidating public opinion against those imposing the embargo.” So the embargo
and the isolation imposed on Iran by the international community end up being
counter-productive. But it’s also true that for years, with Rafsanjani for instance,
running alongside the official policy of mutual threats and intimidation was a
quieter, less visible diplomacy that allowed for lucrative business dealings between
the Iranian ruling class and governments that—in the press at least—would denounce
Iran. Ahmadinejad is different. He’s a frontline revolutionary, ideologically
untainted, uncompromising. Could that spell the end of the kind of submerged diplomacy
that has in fact always kept Teheran connected to the rest of the world? “Ahmadinejad
counts for very little,” Professor Sabahi declares in no uncertain terms. “He’s
not the one deciding these things. Take Rafsanjani for instance. Even though he
lost the election, he’s much more powerful than Ahmadinejad. As far as morality
goes, we have to acknowledge that while Rafsanjani got rich when he was in power,
Ahmadinejad sold his house in Teheran, where he was mayor, and gave the money
to charity. But he doesn’t make the decisions that really count—just like with
Khatami, who never got to carry out all the reforms he wanted.” So perhaps Ahmadinejad’s
bellicose rhetoric needs to be considered in context. But doesn’t it offer the
US an excuse for military intervention, as famous journalist Seymour Hersch has
argued? “I don’t think that’s a real possibility,” Professor Sabahi concludes.
“Iran has always been a nation-state—it’s not just one of those countries created
on the drawing board by colonial powers. And even though it contains a variety
of different peoples, it maintains a strong sense of self. This strong sense of
identity would always get the upper hand and make any attempt at invasion utterly
counter-productive. I don’t believe anyone can think invasion is an opportune
strategy.
Counter-productive policy. The Iranian government held rallies in the streets of major cities to celebrate
enrichment of the first, small amounts of uranium—the first step in a process
that will make Iran a nuclear power. The Iranian government claims that uranium
enrichment is necessary for civil use and to satisfy energy demands; the US feels
Iran’s intentions are less noble. But to what extent do Ahmadinejad and his aggressive
rhetoric represent Iran? “It’s difficult and wrong to make simple generalizations. Iran is a complicated
country with seventy million people. He represents an emerging military and paramilitary
class that took shape during the Iran-Iraq war in the eighties and that developed
its own ideology at that time,” responds professor Sabahi. “Many of them didn’t
vote for him and a lot of others criticize the ones who did. They say it would
have been better to hold your nose and vote for Rafsanjani—like I did at first—even
though he’s corrupt and got rich while in power. But a regime of sanctions, which
effects the civilian population and certainly not the élite ayatollahs, and a
press campaign against Iran risk having the opposite effect. If for no other reason
because Iran is a country where there’s a lot to criticize, not just the nuclear
program.” The plot is a familiar one from Iraq, Cuba, and elsewhere. A government
is targeted by the international community, diplomatic pressure often turns into
sanctions and, in some cases, an attempt to overthrow the government. But results
show that in most cases the civilian population suffers most.
Dark future. “The international embargo on Iran, for instance, effects civil aviation,” the
professor explains, “because the country’s aircraft are mostly Boeings acquired
back when the Shah was in power and now they can’t get replacement parts. Purchase
of aircraft from the European Airbus consortium has also been blocked. This is
just one way the embargo effects the lives of Iranians, but it’s certainly not
the ruling class. The embargo basically has the effect—as Rafsanjani himself admitted—of
consolidating public opinion against those imposing the embargo.” So the embargo
and the isolation imposed on Iran by the international community end up being
counter-productive. But it’s also true that for years, with Rafsanjani for instance,
running alongside the official policy of mutual threats and intimidation was a
quieter, less visible diplomacy that allowed for lucrative business dealings between
the Iranian ruling class and governments that—in the press at least—would denounce
Iran. Ahmadinejad is different. He’s a frontline revolutionary, ideologically
untainted, uncompromising. Could that spell the end of the kind of submerged diplomacy
that has in fact always kept Teheran connected to the rest of the world? “Ahmadinejad
counts for very little,” Professor Sabahi declares in no uncertain terms. “He’s
not the one deciding these things. Take Rafsanjani for instance. Even though he
lost the election, he’s much more powerful than Ahmadinejad. As far as morality
goes, we have to acknowledge that while Rafsanjani got rich when he was in power,
Ahmadinejad sold his house in Teheran, where he was mayor, and gave the money
to charity. But he doesn’t make the decisions that really count—just like with
Khatami, who never got to carry out all the reforms he wanted.” So perhaps Ahmadinejad’s
bellicose rhetoric needs to be considered in context. But doesn’t it offer the
US an excuse for military intervention, as famous journalist Seymour Hersch has
argued? “I don’t think that’s a real possibility,” Professor Sabahi concludes.
“Iran has always been a nation-state—it’s not just one of those countries created
on the drawing board by colonial powers. And even though it contains a variety
of different peoples, it maintains a strong sense of self. This strong sense of
identity would always get the upper hand and make any attempt at invasion utterly
counter-productive. I don’t believe anyone can think invasion is an opportune
strategy.Christian Elia
Topic:
Related articles:
Most discussed topics:
Most frequently used keywords:
