written for PeaceReporter by
Angelo Baracca*

The history of the NPT. The history of nuclear proliferation is effectively long, complex and tortuous. After the nuclear powers had developed these arms (USA in 1945, USSR in 1949, Great Britain in 1952, France and Israel in 1960, and China in 1964), in 1968 the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed (the NPT, which came into force in 1970: France and China signed up only in 1992, Israel has never joined). This treaty was a compromise: the countries which did not have nuclear weapons committed themselves not to produce them, in exchange for a commitment from the nuclear countries to carry out disarmament. This commitment was blatantly not honoured. The non-proliferation regime thus established, and controlled by the International Agency for Atomic Energy (IAAE), remained gravely asymmetric, and did not, in any case, impede the increasing of nuclear arsenals during the decades of the Cold War (up to a maximum of 65 thousand warheads in 1986), even if the "balance of terror”, based on the strategy of “guaranteed mutual destruction”, perhaps contributed to avoiding a nuclear holocaust. The collapse of the USSR fed the great hopes that nuclear weapons would be recognised as obsolete and could be eliminated gradually. In effect, a process of elimination and destruction of warheads was initiated. This process was, however, stopped: the number of warheads existing in the world in 2004 was assessed at almost 13,500 operational (of which approximately 4 thousand non-strategic), out of a total of some 27,600 intact, to which, however, should be added several other thousands of plutonium nuclei (pits) stored as strategic reserves. It is foreseen that when the further reductions have been completed by the USA and Russia, in 2012, there will still be 14 thousand intact warheads in the current 8 nuclear countries.

Return to proliferation. In the meantime a real inversion of the trend has been noticed. The nuclear powers have decided that they will never get rid of their nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future (official programmes up to 2040 are known). Testing by India and Pakistan in 1998 sanctioned the entrance of these two countries, not subscribers to the NPT, into the nuclear club, evidently after years of secret research (but with serious international complicity) in this field. The doctrines relating to nuclear arms, especially in the USA, immediately have an evolution which is, to put it mildly, alarming; which envisages their use even against countries which are suspected of harbouring an intention to use weapons of mass destruction (also chemical and biological), and also as a preventive measure (it must be emphasised that this doctrine violates the NPT, which implies the guarantee for member states that they will not be attacked by nuclear weapons under any circumstances). In short, for the military and the powers that possess them, nuclear weapons are too crucial to be renounced, and also for them to renounce their use. On the contrary, there is research underway to produce nuclear weapons of a completely new type, having less power and less residual radiation, with the intention of cancelling the fundamental distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. But in recent years the situation has got much more serious. Iran is only the pretext for keeping a strategic region in the sights, and it hides the ever-clearer attempt to shelve the entire non-proliferation regime and to start a new phase of nuclear proliferation, custom-made for the White House. A clearer and clearer strategy is emerging. The “nuclear partnership” launched by the United States with India (a clearly anti-China operation – with the recognition of a nuclear state which is not a member of the NPT), is a monstrosity which tends to thwart the treaty, making it a museum-piece.

New powers on the horizon. Whose turn is it next? Periodically, revelations appear concerning Pakistan’s support for a Saudi Arabian military nuclear programme, followed by the ritual, and predictable, denials. But the most concrete risk is today constituted by Japan. It is opportune to remember that, when it was time to join the NPT, there was a debate in government spheres, both in Germany and in Japan, to guarantee that joining would not have definitively blocked the way to obtaining nuclear weapons. The two countries are among those which have accumulated the largest quantities of plutonium through reprocessing the spent fuel from their nuclear reactors (respectively 24 and 40-45 tonnes: to make a bomb, only a few kilograms are necessary, depending on its sophistication).
It must be remembered that plutonium is the ideal nuclear explosive, and that, even if the plutonium generated by civilian reactors (reactor-grade) does not have the same characteristics as military plutonium (weapons-grade), it can still be used in bombs. USA and Great Britain have officially exploded warheads with reprocessed plutonium. Japan and Germany are thus two countries (but not the only two) who possess the materials and the technical and scientific capacity to produce sophisticated nuclear weapons in a very short time (latent proliferation, or stand-by). In Japan a genuine escalation is underway: the desire to review the post-war constitution in a military sense, and at the same time to produce nuclear weapons, gathers ever more momentum. This escalation has recently peaked with the opening of a new reprocessing plant in Rokkasho-Mura, a plant costing 21 billion dollars, which will separate 8 tonnes of plutonium a year.

Arming oneself under the counter. It must be clear that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel has the sole scope of separating plutonium, since it multiplies the volume of the radioactive products and waste to be guarded. In a few years Japan will become the country which possesses the most plutonium in the world. What will it be used for? The suspicions are more than justified. Let it be remembered that Washington has never spoken out against any Japanese military projects, which can be considered favourably in an anti-Chinese context. Then there is a very serious, but little-known, circumstance to be highlighted. The IAAE is responsible for checking that nuclear projects do not have military diversions. But, apart from the agency’s budget limitations, the control techniques available today for plutonium are subject to intrinsic uncertainty and errors of some per cent: in a commercial plant which reprocesses tonnes of plutonium every year, it is absolutely impossible to detect the disappearance, or the failure to account for tens of kilograms of plutonium, when just a few kilos are sufficient to make a bomb. In the British reprocessing plant Sellafield, in 2004, a leak of the acid solution of the irradiated fuel was detected, which was only revealed after 8 months, when 83 thousand litres of solution containing 160 kg of plutonium had leaked! Japan’s ambiguities on its run-up to plutonium may thus legitimise the gravest doubts regarding its real intentions.

The end of the NPT? The production of plutonium in the world must absolutely be stopped: just think that, up to today, 1,250 tonnes of “civilian” plutonium have been produced, of which 250 were separated through reprocessing (250 tonnes of “military” plutonium). Unfortunately, the USA has been opposed for years to the stipulation of a treaty for limiting the production of fissile material. If North Korea had produced, as it sustains, some warheads, it could decide to carry out a test, whenever the other possible courses open to them should be closed. Should this happen, not only Japan, but also South Korea and Taiwan would immediately decide to produce nuclear weapons. On the other hand the message is clear: who has the bomb, showing the international community a fait accompli, will be respected! So it is for India and Pakistan. North Korea is not threatened by an attack at the moment, whereas Iran is, accused only of wanting the bomb some time in the future. If this process should proceed, there is a strong risk that many countries would find their membership of the NPT to penalise them, and would consider the opportunity of abandoning it (something which the treaty allows). The risks of a reprisal of nuclear proliferation on a global scale, hence, are today very concrete. If anyone thinks that this picture is too alarmist, they should remember that nuclear weapons are different from all other weapons in that they must be stopped before they are used and because their use opens the way to unequalled apocalyptic scenarios. There is only one possible way forward: we must resume the process of total nuclear disarmament, starting from the informing and making aware of public opinion, sustaining the group of countries which are committed in this direction, reinforcing the NPT and the verification system, reviving the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation, extending the Denuclearised Zones and stopping the production of fissile material.