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Today, 29 September 2005, the Algerian population are going to vote. Usually
you vote for your future, but it appears that in Algeria you vote for a different
reason – for the past. Since the end of the civil war, which cost the country
so many lives, Algeria has been trying to live again, but the lacerations created
by a justice system that hasn’t been able to punish the guilty are still too deep.
The person responsible for the rebirth of Algeria after the "dirty war" is Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, the president of the Republic. Since coming to power his policy towards
the crimes committed during the war, whether by the army or by the fundamentalists,
has always been to let bygones be bygones, first with an amnesty and now with
a referendum. The objective is to draw a line under the past, consigning the massacres
to history and those responsible for them to oblivion. But instead of a vote about
this question it seems to be more a referendum on the president himself, who won
the last elections and was confirmed president of Algeria because he was the man
who supported pacification. Given the meagre results, with hundreds of people
killed in clashes between the army and fundamentalists, he’s now playing the definitive
card designed to finish once and for all with the past. But who is Bouteflika?
Here’s his story, told by an Algerian journalist.
Karim Metref
The French massacres. They arrived in brand new cars and armoured vehicles, leading a well-nourished
and well-armed "Frontier Army" made up of healthy, well-trained young soldiers.
They knew they had the support of all the Arab regimes of the time, headed by
Nasser. They took control, almost without any resistance, from the trembling hands
of an internal army that was exhausted by seven years of ferocious war against
one of the strongest military powers in the world. Everybody knows that the Algerian
war wasn’t a military victory. France carried out a terrible slaughter with more
than one million dead, the vast majority of whom were civilians. The National
Liberation Army (the internal part) was almost decimated in 1960. While the first
secret negotiations were going on with political representatives of the National
Liberation Front, the French government had, since the end of the 1950s, been
carrying out a series of large-scale military operations. The French Defence Minister
at the time, Andre Morice, ordered the construction along the border of a barrier
made of various lines of electrified barbed wire laid over land that had been
strewn with anti-personnel mines, in an attempt to isolate Algeria from Morocco
and Tunisia (the so-called Ligne Morice), and to stop the arrival of arms, ammunition
and other equipment. The Cabila and Aures mountains, which were often used by
the partisan forces, were singled out for special attention with large-scale military
operations launched against them, like Operation Jumelle, which severely tested
the resistance of the rebels. In addition, the Massu paras needed less than two
years to flush out the famous urban guerrillas of Ben Mhidi Yacef Saadi in what
became known as the Battle of Algiers.
The end of an era. In the end international pressure, international public opinion and French public
opinion, which was tired of the war, forced the French government to negotiate.
The result of the negotiations was the self-determination referendum of 1961 which
produced the independence of what was, just as India was for the British, the
jewel in the crown of Imperial France.
The need for change. It became clear that it was necessary to find a political solution, that the
savage repressions and, even worse, the bloody manipulation of the massacre period
was only pushing the country further into chaos.Large parts of the establishment and the military began to organise themselves.
They began looking for someone who still had enough credibility to start over
again and construct the future of Algeria.
The godsend. Strangely enough the group of generals who had been in control of power in Algeria
for more than 20 years, were all former officers in the French army during the
war of liberation. As soon as negotiations had been started for Algerian self-determination
in 1958, a number of Algerian junior offices (who often had recently been promoted
to lieutenant), began to desert the army. The promotion was known as Lacoste,
after the French governor of Algeria at the time, Robert Lacoste, a staunch believer
in "l’Algérie française". These young "hotheads" didn’t, however, dash off to join the partisans being
massacred in the mountains, but saved themselves by fleeing to Tunisia and Morocco
to join the "Frontier Army", where the future of Algeria was really being decided.
The Boutef reign. During the years of travelling and business deals, particularly in the west-supporting
Gulf states, Abdelaziz Bouteflika established good relations with the Western
powers, even though he had been a minister in the "anti-imperialist" government
of Boumedienne. Both parties had learnt to appreciate the other side and when
he arrived in Algeria to announce his intention to run for the presidency of the
Republic, the United States were his main sponsors. All the opposition forces
went to the American ambassador to ask for guarantees that the elections would
be carried out fairly, but despite this the elections were not fair, although
this is another story. The first mandate for "Boutef" was dedicated almost exclusively
to reinforcing his power, and it wasn’t easy. He had to face a frontal attack
from some generals and from a section of the press that supported them. The kidnapping
of 30 Swiss and German tourists was a clear signal from the DRS, the organisation
that had been foremost in manipulating the various armed groups during the "Dirty
War". The daily newspaper, Le Matin, with the powerful general Mohamed Lamari
behind it, who at the time was the Chief of Staff, conducted an all-out war against
the president, printing daily reports about the scandals he and his closest advisors
were involved in, while the editor of the paper published in France a book that
immediately became a best seller under the title "Bouteflika, an Algerian impostor".
A large part of the National Liberation Front party, which traditionally had always
supported the president, moved over in mass to the challenger, Ali Benfliss, and
the Cabilia were blazing and steeped in blood for more than two years. Everything
seemed to be going against Boutef, but history proved this wrong when he won a
second mandate with 80% of the vote, a result that didn’t so much reflect the
popularity of the president as the power the system’s candidate had and the degree
of control he had over the secret services and administrative departments. Nowadays
Benfliss, together with the NLF party, is back in the fold. General Lamari has
resigned, the other generals are falling over themselves to kiss the re-elected
president’s hand and Le Matin newspaper has been closed down and its editor, Benchicou,
is rotting in prison without anybody worrying about him, while "little Boutef"
is in charge of everything, without any problems. Or almost.